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Abstract. Fault tolerance is very important for complex component-based 
software systems, but its configuration is complicated and challenging. In this 
paper, we propose a model driven approach to semi-automatic configuration of 
fault tolerance solutions. At design time, a set of reusable fault tolerance solu-
tions are modeled as architecture styles, with the key properties verified by 
model checking. At runtime, the runtime software architecture of the target sys-
tem is automatically constructed by the code generated from the given architec-
tural meta-model. Then, the impact of each component on the system reliability 
is automatically analyzed to recommend which components should be consid-
ered in the fault tolerance configuration. Finally, after which components are 
guaranteed by what fault tolerance solution is decided by the system administra-
tion, the architecture model is automatically changed by merging with the se-
lected fault tolerance styles and finally, these changes are automatically propa-
gated to the target system. This approach is evaluated on Java enterprise sys-
tems. 
Keywords: fault tolerance, component-based system, dynamic configuration, 
mode driven approach, software architecture. 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Fault tolerance is well studied and practiced in the past decades. For different types of 
systems or different sources of faults, we need different fault tolerance solutions [15]. 
For example, if the fault is caused by temporary race between the current re-quests, 
only re-issuing the requests will significantly decrease the rate of fault response. Al-
ternatively, if the fault is caused by an accumulated reason, such as the memory leak, 
rebooting the system or a part of it is usually necessary. Such fault tolerance solutions 
consist of different mechanisms for detecting the faults, buffering the requests, re-
booting the components, recovering the responses, etc.  
In today’s popular component-based systems, fault tolerance solutions themselves 
also become more componentized, that is, fault tolerance mechanisms are implement-
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ed as a set of reusable components by the component framework and can be config-
ured to guarantee or ignore the given system components.  
However, it is not easy to properly reuse the fault-tolerance solutions in complex 
component-based systems. The challenge is twofold. One is how to specify the reusa-
ble fault tolerance solutions on a specific platform. From the structural aspect, the 
specification should make clear the types of components required by the solution, the 
property of each component, and the relation between these components. The difficul-
ty here is how to ensure the automated deployment, and in the meantime make the 
specification easy to understand. From the behavioral aspect, the specification should 
make clear the proper context for each solution, i.e., what type of faults the solution 
fits for, and the effect after deploying the solution. The difficulty here is how to clas-
sify the faults and how to verify the effect before really deploying the solution. Hav-
ing the proper specification of fault-tolerant solutions, the second challenge is how to 
deploy them automatically. The first problem here is how to assist the system admin-
istrators choosing the part of the system to deploy the solution, and the proper solu-
tion to deploy. After choosing the solution, the remaining problem is how to automat-
ically deploy and configure the reusable fault tolerance mechanism according to the 
solution. 
In this paper, we present a model driven approach to specification and semi-
automatic configuration of fault tolerance solutions for component-based systems, on 
the software architecture level. Based on our initial idea of supporting fault tolerance 
at software architecture level with the help of middleware [6], and an existing frame-
work named SM@RT [2] [24] to support runtime model, we provide a systematic and 
automated framework with the help of runtime models, called SM@RT. The whole 
approach is divided into two phases. In the specification phase, the experts of the 
given system or platform define the fault tolerance mechanisms implemented by the 
system, in the form of a specific kind of components named fault tolerance facilities. 
Based on the components, the experts specify the reusable fault tolerance solutions as 
partial architectures composed by some of the existing facilities. The experts also list 
the fault tolerance properties satisfied by each of the solutions, as a reference indicat-
ing what kind of faults is proper to be fixed by this solution. In this phase, our frame-
work provides the code generation support to wrap low-level fault tolerance mecha-
nisms as reusable facilities, the meta-model to construct the partial architecture, and 
the model checking support to verify if the solution satisfies the declared fault toler-
ance properties. In the configuration phase, our framework helps the system adminis-
trators to semi-automatically deploy the proper fault tolerance solutions on the sys-
tem. Specifically, our framework first reflects the system as runtime software archi-
tecture, and then uses this runtime architecture to calculate the key component that 
has the maximal influence to the global system reliability. With these two pieces of 
information as references, the administrator evaluates the type of faults, and chooses 
the proper solution. Finally, our framework automatically deploys the solution to the 
system, by merging the current architecture with the partial architecture specified by 
the solution, and then calculating and executing the required changes between the 
original and the result architecture. 
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The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we an-
alyze the component’s impact on system reliability, and recommend key compo-
nent(s). Secondly, we realize the model merging of runtime software architecture with 
fault tolerance style automatically. Thirdly, a systematic and semi-automated configu-
ration framework is proposed, which is used to configure the fault tolerance solutions 
into component-based systems. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of our 
approach and a motivating example of fault tolerance for an EJB component. Section 
3 describes the concept of FTS (fault tolerance style) and the verification of FTS by 
model checking. Section 4 describes the details of analyzing the key component(s), 
selecting FTS, configuring RSA (runtime software architecture) with FTS, and propa-
gating RSA changes to the target system. Section 5 shows how to use the approach to 
solve the problem in the motivating example. Section 6 shows the related work, and 
section 7 shows the discussion and future work on our approach. 
2  APPROACH OVERVIEW 
In this section, we first illustrate the fault-tolerance solutions on a real component-
based system. Based on this example, we give a brief overview of the complete ap-
proach for modeling and configuring the fault tolerance solutions. 
2.1 Illustrative Example 
ECperf [12] is an EJB benchmark application, which simulates the process of 
manufacturing, supply chain management, and order/inventory in business problems. 
Create-a-New-Order is a typical scenario in ECperf, i.e. a customer lists all products, 
adds some to a shopping cart, and creates a new order. We use a Software Architec-
ture (SA) model to depict the relations among EJBs in this scenario in Fig.1 (NFTUnit 
is none-fault-tolerant component). We assume these EJBs are black boxes. The struc-
tural model of ECperf comes from runtime information analysis, with the monitoring 
support provided by SM@RT. 
 
Fig. 1. The SA of ECperf in the scenario of Create-a-New-Order 
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ECperf cannot tolerate any faults originally, but it needs to be fault tolerable, espe-
cially for ItemBmpEJB, which is a frequently used bean-managed persistent EJB in 
the Create-a-New-Order scenario. The availability of ItemBmpEJB may be imperiled 
by database faults. These faults are permanent – they do not disappear unless the da-
tabase or the connections are recovered, unlike transient faults, which may disappear 
in a nondeterministic manner even when no recovery operation is performed. In addi-
tion, these faults are activated only under certain circumstances like heavy-load or 
heavy communication traffic. So the first fault-tolerance requirement is to make 
ItemBmpEJB capable of tolerating environment-dependent and non-transient (EDNT) 
faults. 
2.2 Approach Overview 
For the above example, the Ecperf is without any fault tolerance function. Our ap-
proach for fault tolerance configuration has four steps as follows: 
(1) Locating the key component(s). Component is the basic unit of component 
based system, and the key component is the one whose reliability matters the most to 
the reliability of the whole system. In this paper, we use a scenario-based reliability 
analysis approach to analyze the reliability of the system and locate the key compo-
nent. 
(2) Selecting suitable FTS. To alleviate the difficulty in the selection of the fault-
tolerance mechanisms, these mechanisms are abstracted as FTS at first. Then the re-
quired fault-tolerance capabilities are specified as fault-tolerance properties, and the 
satisfactions of the required properties for candidate FTSs are verified by model 
checking [6]. The system administrator just needs to input the fault tolerance capabili-
ties which need to be satisfied. 
(3) Configuring RSA with FTS. In this step, we perform fault tolerance by model 
merging at the architecture level. The two models which are merged are RSA and 
FTS. The components in RSA which need to be configured are analyzed in step 1. 
And the suitable FTS is chosen in step 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Model driven configuration of fault tolerance solution 
(4) Propagating the RSA changes to the target system. After step 3, we have per-
formed fault tolerance at architecture level.  For the sake of realizing fault tolerance, 
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we use SM@RT [2][24] to propagate the change to the target system. SM@RT pro-
vides a domain-specific modeling language and a code generator to support model-
based runtime system management. Figure 2 shows the whole process of our ap-
proach. 
3 SOLUTION MODELING 
3.1 The Concept of Fault-Tolerance Styles 
The primary activities of different fault-tolerance mechanisms are similar. They 
control the messages passed in, and monitor or control a component’s states. An ar-
chitectural style is a set of constraints on coordinated architectural elements and rela-
tionships among them. The constraints restrict the role and the feature of architectural 
elements and the allowed relationships among those elements in a SA that conforms 
to that style [21]. Entities in a fault-tolerance mechanism are modeled as components, 
interactions among the entities are modeled as connectors, and constraints in a mech-
anism are modeled as an FTS, from the point of view of architectural style. The archi-
tecture of a fault-tolerant application is a Fault-Tolerance Software Architecture 
(FTSA), which conforms to an FTS and tolerates a kind of fault. 
3.2 Modeling Solutions as Fault-Tolerant Styles 
We use a UML profile for both SA and FT [20, 25] and made necessary extensions 
to specify FTSs and FTSAs. There are three kinds of components in this UML profile: 
«NFTUnit», «FTUnit» and «FTFaci» components. «NFTUnit» components are busi-
ness components without fault-tolerant capability. «FTUnit» components are business 
components with fault-tolerant capability either by its internal design or by applying a 
set of «FTFaci» components to an «NFTUnit» component. We define a stereotype 
«FTFaci» for well-designed and reliable components, which provide FT services for 
«NFTUnit» components. An «NFTUnit» component and its attached «FTFaci» com-
ponents, which interact with each other in a specific manner, form a composite 
«FTUnit» component. There are two kinds of connectors: «FTInfo» and «FTCmd» 
connectors. «FTInfo» connectors are responsible for conveying a component’s states 
to another. «FTCmd» connectors are responsible for changing an «NFTUnit» compo-
nent’s states. 
Based on the profile, we model fault-tolerant mechanisms as FTSs. Each mecha-
nism’s structure is modeled in UML2.0 component diagram. Micro-reboot mecha-
nism [7] is an illustrative mechanism to be modeled as FTS. A Micro-reboot style 
consists of four «FTFaci» components (ExceptionCatcher, Reissuer, FTMgr, and 
BufferRedirector) and an «FTCmd» Reboot connector for an «NFTUnit» component 
(Fig. 3). The ExceptionCatcher catches all unexpected exceptions in the «NFTUnit» 
component. After the caught exceptions are analyzed and the failed component is 
identified, the failed component is rebooted. Meanwhile, the BufferRedirector blocks 
incoming requests for the component during recovery. When the failed component is 
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successfully recovered, the BufferRedirector re-issues the blocked requests and the 
normal process is resumed.   
req<<NFTUnit>>
Client
<<FTFaci>>
Buffer
Redirector
<<FTFaci>>
Reissure
<<FTFaci>>
Exception
Cacher
<<NFTUnit>>
server
<<FTFaci>>
FTMgr
req req req
《FTCmd》enable
《FTCmd》retry
《FTCmd》
returnError
《FTinfo》
notifyError
《FTCmd》
reboot
 
Fig. 3. The component diagram of Micro-reboot style 
3.3 Validation of Solutions 
In this section, we abstract both fault-tolerant capability requirements and fault as-
sumptions on components as fault-tolerant properties. And then we translate a FTS’s 
behavioral models in the UML sequence diagram, the properties, and the constraints 
into verification models, and use model checking to verify the FTS’s satisfaction of 
the properties and the constraints.  
Table 1. Fault assumption and generic fault-tolerant capabilities 
Fault-Tolerant Properties  
Type Property Name & Description 
F
a
u
lt  
A
ssu
m
p
tio
n
 
Transient fault assumption (P1): When a component is providing services and a transient 
fault is activated in it then, its states will be resumed if a fault-tolerant mechanism was applied. 
Transient faults are nondeterministic and are also called “Heisenbugs”. 
Environment-dependent and non-transient (EDNT) fault assumption (P2): When a 
component is providing services and an EDNT fault is activated in it then, its states will be 
resumed if a fault-tolerant mechanism was applied. EDNT faults are deterministic and activated 
only on a specific environment. 
 Environment-independent and non-transient fault assumption (EINT) (P3): When a 
component is providing services and an EINT fault is activated in it then, its states will be 
resumed if a fault-tolerant mechanism was applied. EINT faults are deterministic and are inde-
pendent of specific environment. 
G
en
eric F
a
u
lt 
T
o
lera
n
t C
a
p
a
b
ilities 
Fault containment (P4): If an error is detected in a component, other components would 
not be aware of the situation. 
Fault isolation (P5): When a failed component is being recovered, no new incoming re-
quests can invoke the component. 
Fault propagation (P6): If an un-maskable fault is activated in a component, and it cannot 
be recovered successfully, the client, who issues the request and activates the fault, would 
receive an error response. 
Coordinated error recovery (P7): If a global error, which affects more than one compo-
nent, happened, the error can be recovered. 
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Fault assumption assumes the characters of faults in a component or an application. 
Only when an FTS can deal with a certain kind of fault, it is meaningful to discuss the 
FTS’s other capabilities. Properties P1 to P3 shown in Table 1 denote three fault as-
sumptions. These three properties form a dimension of selecting FTSs. Then fault 
containment, fault isolation, fault propagation, and recovery coordination are four 
generic fault-tolerant capabilities. They are shown in Table 1 as P4 to P7 and form 
another dimension of the selection.  
For fear of error propagation, P4 stipulates that the source of a failure should be 
masked. P5 stipulates that new incoming requests cannot arrive at a failed component. 
Because not all errors can be masked, property P6 states that if a failed component 
cannot be recovered, the error should be allowed to propagate to others to trigger a 
global recovery process. This is important for some faults that can be tolerated by 
coordinated recovery among several dependent components.  P7 means that both of 
the failed component and the components which depend on it need to be recovered. 
It should be noted that the above fault-tolerant properties only cover some im-
portant and typical ones, and they are distilled from a study of FT. Other properties, 
such as those presented in Yuan et al.’s study [22], can also be appended to the table. 
Verification of FTS  
We verify the FTS by translating the intuitive behavior description into the formal 
specification in Promela, and then evaluate the formal on by the model checker SPIN. 
We predefine a set of templates to automatically translate the extended UML2.0 
sequence diagrams into Promela. The automatic translation of standard elements in 
UML2.0 sequence diagram has been addressed in related literature [23]. Interaction 
elements in UML2.0 sequence diagram, such as timeline and message dispatch, are 
mapped to basic block or elements in Promela, such as process (proctype) and chan-
nel (chan element). Structured control operators in UML2.0 sequence diagrams, such 
as conditional execution and loop execution, are mapped to control-flow constructs in 
Promela, such as the selection statement (if…fi) and loop statement (do…od). And 
the details are illustrated in our previous work [6]. 
3.4 Solutions provided by Java Application Server 
Using the specification mechanism, we summarized four FT solutions on a con-
crete system type, the Java Application Server. These solutions are widely used in the 
JEE systems, and the reusable facilities constituting them are able to implement based 
on the JEE techniques. An experiment implementation of all these facilities on the 
JBoss application server can be found in our previous work [9]. And the four solu-
tions are listed as follows: 
 Simple retry style: send the failed request again. 
 N-copy programming style: send a request to several instances of a component, 
avoiding the failure of a few instances. 
 Micro reboot style: initialize the failed component and recover it to original state. 
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 Retry block style: send the request to a component instance. If the return result is 
an error, modify the request, restore the environment state and resend the request. 
4 SOLUTION CONFIGURATION 
4.1 Construct Runtime Software Architecture 
As our fault-tolerant approach is performed at the architecture level, we need to do 
the following steps to get the runtime system information: 
1. Define the meta architectural model of the target system. 
2. Define the access model of the target system. 
3. Generate the code and instantiate the RSA. 
The meta-model of the target system defines the structure of RSA, including prop-
erty, class, and association between classes. The access model defines the methods 
which used to get the runtime system information. The method get() is used to get the 
system information and set() is used to modify the system properties. In this paper, we 
use SM@RT to define the access model, generate the synchronization code, and in-
stantiate the RSA. 
4.2 Analyze Component’s Reliability Impact 
In this section, a scenario based reliability analysis approach is described, and then 
we introduce a SBRA-based algorithm to find out the key components which have the 
crucial influence to the system. 
Scenario-Based Reliability Analysis Approach  
SBRA is a reliability analysis technique for component-based software, which was 
proposed by Sherif Yacoub et al. in [4]. Using scenarios of component interactions, 
they construct a probabilistic model named Component-Dependency Graph (CDG). 
Based on CDG, a reliability analysis algorithm is developed to analyze the reliability 
of the system as a function of reliabilities of its architectural constituents. 
A CDG is defined as follows: 
CDG=<N,E,s,t> 
N={n},which is a set of nodes in the graph; E={e},which is a set of directed edges 
in the graph; s and t are the start and termination nodes.  
n=<NCi, RCi, ECi>   n∈N, models a component  Ci, NCi is the name of component 
Ci, RCi is the reliability of component Ci, and ECi is the average execution time of the 
component Ci. 
e=<Tij, RTij, PTij>  e∈E, models the control flow transfer from one component to 
another. Tij is the transition name from node ni to nj, denoted < ni, nj >, RTij is the 
transition’s reliability, and PTij is the transition’s execution probability. Fig. 4 shows 
the CDG of a system consisting of four components. 
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Fig. 4. A sample CDG 
A CDG is an input parameter of SBRA, and the other input is AEappl, which is the 
average execution time of the application. SBRA is shown in Fig.5. The output is 
Rappl, the reliability of the application.  
Fig. 5.  SBRA                                     Fig. 6. Select Key Components  
SBRA-based Algorithm for Selecting Key Components 
The reliability of an application is affected by several attributes in SBRA, such as 
the reliability and use frequency of each component, which means some components 
have a stronger influence on the reliability of the whole system than others. The fre-
quency of each component depends on the scenarios. Several techniques have been 
proposed to estimate the reliability of software components, such as fault injection, 
Parameters  
Consumes CDG, AEappl 
Produces   Rappl 
Initialization: 
      Rappl=0;Time=0;Rtemp=1; 
Algorithm 
Push tuple<C1, RC1, EC1>, Time, Rtemp 
While Stack not EMPTY do 
        Pop <Ci, RCi, ECi>, Time, Rtemp 
        if   Time>AEappl or Ci=t; 
                  Rappl+=Rtemp; 
       else  
              <Cj,RCj,ECj> ∈children(Ci) 
               push(<Cj,RCj,ECj>,Time+=ECi, 
Rtemp=Rtemp*RCi*RTij*PTij) 
end 
end while 
Parameters  
Consumes CDG, AEappl 
Produces  
componentList <componentName, Rappl> 
Initialization: 
      Rappl=0; 
      for each components RCi=0.8; 
Algorithm: 
for each component <Ci,RCi,ECi> 
         RCi=RCi+0.2;    
         Rappl=SBRA(); 
         componentList.add(<Ci,Rappl>); 
RCi=0.8; 
for <Ci,Rappl> in  componentList 
         sorted by Rappl decending; 
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testing, and retrospective analysis. In order to discover the key components, we value 
the reliability of components statically and run the SBRA-based algorithm in Fig.6. 
In the above algorithm, SBRA() returns the reliability of the whole system, which is 
calculated from the CDG. We assume the reliability of each component is 0.8 at first. 
Before invoking SBRA each time, the current component’s reliability is improved to 
1. So the value of Rappl is the reliability of the system after the current component’s 
reliability improved. That means the component with the maximum value of Rappl is 
the key component. 
4.3 Select proper solutions 
Given a specific application, a set of requirements on fault-tolerant capabilities, 
and a set of candidate FTSs, it is critical to select the most suitable one for concerned 
components in the application to meet the requirements. We assist the system admin-
istrators in selecting the proper solutions by providing them the following to guid-
ance: fault assumptions and fault-tolerant capabilities.  
 
Fig. 7.  The satisfaction of properties for Simple retry style, N-copy programming style, Micro-
reboot style, and Retry blocks style. (√: preserve; ×: do not preserve). Fault assumptions form 
a dimension; other fault-tolerant properties form another dimension.  
In model checking process, Spin simulates a FTS’s behavior and traverses all its 
states combinations. A component’s states are defined and stored in variables. These 
states are initialized at the beginning, and re-assigned by fault simulation function and 
state transit rules. When Spin control flow arrives at an assertion, it checks the truth or 
not of the assertion. It either confirms that the properties hold or reports that they are 
violated. A false assertion means the style does not preserve the property represented 
by the assertion, and a counter-example is provided. Otherwise, the above verification 
process continues. When all assertions are true, it means the FTS satisfies all the con-
cerned properties. The result in Fig.7 shows four fault-tolerant styles’ satisfaction to 
fault-tolerant properties. 
4.4 Configure RSA with fault-tolerant styles 
The fault-tolerant styles define the topological structure and behavior restriction of 
fault-tolerant components and the business components. For the sake of implementa-
tion of fault tolerance at the architecture level, we just need to merge the RSA with a 
suitable FTS. And the change can be propagated to the system by the modification on 
middleware. This process is accomplished automatically, which avoids configuration 
errors and reduces the burden of system architects. The inputs of this kind of configu-
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ration are components which need to be configured, a selected FTS and the RSA of 
the application. The output is a fault-tolerant runtime software architecture. 
The key of the configuration process is the automatic composition of RSA with 
FTS. In this paper, it is achieved based on Model Merging or Model Composition 
[18] [19]. Model Merging is a special kind of model transformation, and the function 
of Model Merging is merging two models MA and MB, conforming to meta-model 
MMA and MMB, respectively, and the result is MC, conforming to meta-model 
MMC [19]. MA is called Receiving Model, MB is called Merged Model, and the 
merging process is to merge the elements in MB into MA, and produce a Resulting 
Model MC. In general, there are two phases in Model Merging: comparison and 
merging. In the first phase, it needs to determine the match relationship automatically 
between the elements in Receiving Model and the elements in Merged Model. The 
second step, merging, adds the elements in Merged Model to the Receiving Model 
automatically in light of the match relation. 
 
Fig. 8.  The merging of RSA with FTS and the QVT implementation 
In this paper, the Merged Model is FTS, and the Receiving Model is RSA. The Re-
sulting Model is fault-tolerant runtime software architecture. The process is illustrated 
in Fig.8, and we use QVT (Query/View/Transformation) to implement the merging, 
which is a standard set of languages for model transformation defined by the Object 
Management Group. 
4.5 Propagate RSA changes to the target system 
For the sake of getting the real system with fault tolerant, we realized the following 
steps: firstly, we provide fault-tolerant sandboxes for application components. And 
then, encapsulate the operations which are used to add (remove) a component or a 
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connection between two components. Thirdly, we use QVT to realize model compari-
son [11], which is used to compare the original RSA with FTSA. And the comparison 
result will guide the modification of the target system. 
5 EVALUATIONS 
In this section, we use the approach to configure ECperf with fault-tolerant solu-
tions. 
5.1 Select Key Components on ECperf 
We obtain the CDG of ECperf via runtime information analysis, with the monitor-
ing support provided by a reflective JEE Application Server (AS), which is shown in 
Fig.9. After executing the SBRA, the result is shown in Fig.10, the component name 
as the abscissa, and the ordinate is the reliability of the system after the reliability of 
the corresponding component improved. 
Figure 10 shows that there are 3 key components: ItemEnt, OrderSes, and Or-
derEnt. The reliability of the application will be maximized, if the reliability of these 
three components is improved. The component ItemEnt is invoked 403 times in the 
process of creating a new order, while others are invoked no more than 10 times. And 
ItemEnt is invoked by OrderEnt, which is invoked by OrderSes. There is a strong 
dependence between them. So it is easy to understand the three components are key 
components. The QVT code of SBRA can be downloaded from our google code pro-
ject[3]. 
CustomerEnt
RuleEnt DiscountEnt
Util
OrderSes
OrderEnt OrderLineEnt
client
 ItemEnt
LargeOrderSes
LargeOrderEnt
     
Fig. 9. The CDG of ECperf                                   Fig. 10. The reliability of system  
5.2 Select FTS for the Key Component 
ECperf runs on a sequential execution environment (JEE AS), so N-Copy Pro-
gramming style cannot be used because they require concurrent execution support.  
Then the remaining candidates include Retry Blocks style, Simple Retry style, and 
Micro-reboot style. There are no more ECperf-specific characters help to select or 
exclude one of the above candidates. To select a proper FTS from existing ones, we 
select the most suitable FTS by applying the procedure presented in 4.3. 
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The fault assumption of the three components is EDNT. And we need the FTS to 
satisfy the property P4-P7. The result is shown in Fig.7. And Micro-reboot style is the 
winner because it fits the EDNT fault assumption and supports all the properties, but 
the other three styles cannot. 
5.3 Merge Ecperf with FTS 
In section 5.2, the set of key components is acquired, and SETkey-comp={ItemEnt, 
OrderSes, OrderEnt }. In section 5.3, we find out that the micro-reboot style is suita-
ble. Each element of the SETkey-comp corresponds to the component “server” in FTS. 
As there are three components that need to be configured, the merging process has 
three steps. And the match relationship is shown in Fig.11. 
Fig. 11.  The match relationship of RSA and FTS 
 
Fig. 12. The software architecture after first merging  
The first step is to configure ItemEnt with micro-reboot style. In this process, 
“ItemEnt” corresponds to the “server”, and “OrderEnt” corresponds to the “client”. 
And the invocation between OrderEnt and ItemEnt disappeared. The result is shown 
in fig 12. The next two steps are similar. And we implement the model merging by 
QVT, the source code can be downloaded in our google code project [3]; 
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We create three different versions of fault-tolerant ECperf by modifying its origi-
nal SA. Each version conforms to one of the above three FTS. We also perform a set 
of comparative experiments to validate the practical correctness of the selection. In 
the experiments, micro-reboot mechanisms and simple retry mechanism are attached 
to the components as external utility mechanisms, with the supports of SM@RT. We 
periodically inject Java exceptions into ItemBmpEJB to simulate EDNT faults. As a 
result, the rates of successful submitted orders using Micro-reboot and Simple Retry 
are 87.3% and 50.7%, respectively, compare to 45.4% with no FT (Fig.13). It is clear 
that Micro-reboot style works better than Simple Retry style. The experimental result 
is consistent with the model checking result. It should also be minded that the fault 
tolerance induces performance penalty. When no exceptions are injected into the ex-
periments, the response time is 19.12s with no FT, and 21.71s with micro-reboot 
(Fig.13), which increases 13.49% of response time on average. 
 
Fig. 13. The comparison success rate and response time 
5.4 Discussion 
From the evaluations of ECperf, we can see that the whole configuration process is 
more automatic than our previous work [6, 9], system advocates just need to specify 
the fault-tolerant properties that the target system needs to satisfy. In this section, we 
have a discussion after the experiment. 
FTS Specification. We have described four fault tolerance solutions in this paper, 
and abstracted them into FTS: micro-reboot style, simple retry style, N-copy pro-
gramming style, and retry block style. There are still some other solutions (such as 
Recovery Blocks style, N-Version Programming style, etc.), and we can leave them as 
future work.  
Key Component Recommendation. In this paper, we use SBRA to estimate the 
reliability of the whole system, and recommend key components. And the analysis 
result is tallied with the actual situation. We choose SBRA mainly because it is a 
typical method for component-based system with a "CDG" model, which is more in 
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favor of the analysis at architecture level. Some other component-based algorithms, 
such as the K. Goseva-Popstojanova’s approach [27], can be integrated into our 
framework, by specifying the process in QVT. 
Configuration Framework For a complex component-based software system, the 
fault tolerance configuration process is complicated and challenging as follows: the 
components which need configuration are indeterminate; the fault-tolerant solutions 
are undefined; and the configuration process is without a guide. In this paper, we 
successfully handle these problems at architecture level: we abstract the target system 
into SA, which helps to identify the key component; we abstract the fault tolerance 
solution into FTS, which helps to check the fault tolerance properties and the selec-
tion of solutions; and the configuration process is under the model merging’s guid-
ance. In common cases, users only need to choose the FTS and target component, 
based on our recommendation. No future configuration or coding work is required. If 
users want to define their own FTS, integrate other analysis algorithms, etc., they just 
use the MOF standard languages to define their extension work at the model level. 
6 RELATED WORK 
In the area of Architecting Fault-Tolerant Systems [1], components (computing enti-
ties), connectors (communication entities), and configuration (topology of compo-
nents and connectors) have been used to model fault-tolerant software as FTSA. Pre-
vious work in the area mainly focuses on how to model a specific fault-tolerant mech-
anism [10, 13, 14, 25, 26], for example, exception handling-based mechanism [14, 
26]. A few studies consider the reasoning or analysis on an FTS. Yuan et al. [26] 
specify a Generic Fault-Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA), which obeys ideal-
ized Fault-Tolerant Component style, in formal language Object-Z, and performs 
manual formal proofs to demonstrate fault-tolerant properties the GFTSA preserves. 
The authors also present a template to automate the customization process when using 
the style. Sözer et al. [25] specify the structure of a local recovery style in an UML 
profile, and perform performance overhead and availability analysis. In contrast, we 
uniformly model and analysis various mechanisms that can be used for third-party 
components as fault-tolerant styles. 
The study of Architecting Fault-Tolerant Systems aims to achieve better fault-
tolerant software by including FT in earlier development phase to bridge the gap be-
tween the requirement to build dependable software systems and the implementation 
to deal with failures in the software. As one of the important fault-tolerance mecha-
nisms, exception handling is widely used in the study of architecting fault-tolerant 
software systems. A notable study is the CORRECT project [8] in Luxembourg, 
which introduces the Coordinated Atomic Actions (CAAs) mechanism in SA specifi-
cation phase. The resulting SA specification with fault-tolerance notations is trans-
formed into CAAs model automatically and further, transformed to an implementa-
tion framework. The output of such approach is a skeleton code that satisfies the func-
tional and fault-tolerant requirements. It is based on model-driven techniques, and 
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separates the function design from the fault-tolerant design of the system in the model 
layer. However, it only supports a specific fault-tolerant technology without any oth-
ers. The approach in this paper abstracts the fault-tolerant technologies as FTS, and 
identifies the components which need to be configured automatically, which means 
the assemblers just need to input the properties which need to be satisfied. 
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a model driven configuration of fault tolerance solution for com-
ponent-based system. It needs to be polished in the future. At one side, the approach 
just provides an enablement to satisfy the fault-tolerant capabilities in the situation of 
a fault assumption. What capabilities should be satisfied and the type of fault assump-
tion are given by developers. Therefore, how to facilitate the use of the enablement is 
critical for practice. For example, a powerful exception analysis support can alleviate 
the burden of developers in identifying which type of fault assumption the fault be-
longs to. The fault detection mechanisms help to decide what kind of fault-tolerant 
capabilities should be satisfied. On the other side, the fault-tolerant configuration may 
be more general and efficient. However, since the number of popular middleware in a 
period is relatively few, we argue that making a concrete middleware more powerful 
on exception handling is more important. This study is being carried out now, with 
the help of our Runtime Software Architecture [5][24]. 
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